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Abstract Smart meters inform the electricity suppli-
ers about the consumption of their clients in short in-
tervals. Fine-grained electricity consumption informa-
tion is highly sensitive as it has been proven to permit
to infer people’s habits like, for instance, the time they
leave or arrive home. Hence, appropriate measures have
to be taken to preserve clients’ privacy in smart meter-
ing systems. In this paper, we first analyze a recent
proposal by Busom et al. (2016) and show how a cor-
rupted substation is able to get the individual reading
of any arbitrarily chosen smart meter without requir-
ing the collaboration of any other party. After that,
we propose a way to fix the mentioned security flaw
which is based on adding an additional step in which
the substation proves that it has properly followed all
the protocol steps. Our solution is analyzed and shown
to be computationally feasible for realistic parameter
choices.
Keywords Encryption · Homomorphism · Privacy ·
Smart Metering
1 Introduction
Electricity cannot be stored in large quantities so elec-
tricity suppliers need an accurate prediction of con-
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sumption requirements and trends to properly adjust
the production while avoiding electricity surplus. Fine-
grained consumption data are required to that end.
Smart meters are household devices that record and
transmit electricity consumption readings regularly, i.e.,
every 15 or 30 minutes. Transmission of fine-grained
electricity consumption readings raises concerns about
privacy, since they allow to infer behavioral patterns
like the time a customer gets back home, goes to sleep,
or is on vacation.
This can be achieved by means of Nonintrusive Ap-
pliance Load Monitor (NALM) [1]. By making use of
signal processing methods, such techniques are able to
identify the individual loads that compose a consump-
tion trace. Hence, the information transmitted by a
smart meter allows to determine, with a high degree
of accuracy, the way in which appliances are used in a
house.
Worldwide deployment of smart meters is a reality,
and as they increase in popularity and use, appropri-
ate solutions have to be implemented in order to pro-
vide security and privacy. An analysis and classification
of privacy-preserving proposals for smart metering is
given in [2].
Privacy in smart metering is a topic that is actively
discussed by the industry, governments, and the re-
search community. Any privacy-preserving solution will
have to be traded off against the provisioning of ad-
vanced functionalities requiring access to personal data.
That is the case for the generation of personal reports
with recommendations to reduce the bill, or agreements
in which the energy supplier can, for instance, tem-
porarily pause the recharging of electric cars when the
demand exceeds the supply.
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1.1 Contribution and plan of this paper
In this paper we first describe a security flaw found
in a homomorphic aggregation-based smart metering
system [3]. By exploiting that flaw, a misbehaving sub-
station is able to obtain the non-aggregated reading of
any smart meter. The attack can be performed by a
corrupted substation which, without being noticed by
the smart meters, during a round transmits a specially
manipulated message to some targeted smart meter. By
combining the obtained response with the data trans-
mitted in a forthcoming round, the substation obtains
the individual reading of the targeted meter.
After describing the security flaw, we propose a way
to modify [3] so that it is no longer vulnerable to the
mentioned attack. Our solution is based on requiring
the substation to prove, after each round, that the pro-
tocol has been properly followed. This involves the trans-
mission of an additional message at the end of each
round.
We will not discuss the problem of group selection,
which is a common problem faced by all aggregation-
based schemes, and is therefore out of the scope of this
contribution to solve it. We are going to assume there
is a minimum group size and that the substation can
not manipulate at will the composition of the groups.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows:
Section 2 provides an overview on privacy-preserving
technology for smart metering, with a deep focus on
aggregation-based techniques. Section 3 briefly explains
the original proposal by Busom et al. together with the
security flaw we identified. We present a solution to the
flaw in Section 4. In Section 5 the security of the re-
sulting fixed proposal is formally analyzed. Section 6
presents some experimental results showing the feasi-
bility of the fixed protocol, while Section 7 concludes
the paper.
2 Related work
In a smart metering scenario, we differentiate two types
of data sent from the meters to the service provider:
– Data for billing purposes,
– Data for real time consumption monitoring.
For billing purposes, identifiable communications are
used for transmitting the sum of electricity consump-
tion values (e.g., once per month) to the service provider.
This is the approach taken in the smart metering ar-
chitecture designed by the Germany’s information secu-
rity agency [4]. More elaborated solutions are required
when time-of-use tariffs are used. Rial and Danezis [5]
propose a privacy-preserving protocol for billing calcu-
lations. It makes use of zero-knowledge proofs (ZKP)
to ensure the fee is correct without disclosing any con-
sumption data. ZKP-based proposals like [5] and also [6]
are classified as belonging to the verifiable computation
class in [2]. All these solutions involve high computation
capabilities for meters.
Regarding the transmission of fine-grained consump-
tion readings (required for consumption monitoring),
the proposals for the privacy protection of such commu-
nications can be classified into several types according
to the employed technique:
– Anonymization: data are transmitted after remov-
ing the link between an electricity reading and the
identity of the customer transmitting it [4,7,8,9].
These solutions usually require the smart meters to
include the capability to manage pseudonyms and
sign data. The communication overhead reduces to
the additional information required for data authen-
tication or pseudonym transmission, when required
by the system.
– Perturbation: some random noise is added by me-
ters to the readings before they are transmitted.
The random noise will not be removed. Therefore,
such solutions must be tuned to provide an adequate
trade-off between accuracy and privacy [10,11]. This
approach is very cheap to implement as only a sim-
ple random number generator is needed inside the
meter. The communication overhead is null.
– Aggregation: the smart meters are partitioned into
groups that aggregate their readings before they are
transmitted to the company [11,12,13,14,15,16,17,
18,19,20,3,21]. Data can be aggregated by making
use of the homomorphic property of some cryptosys-
tems (referred to as the cryptographic computation
class in [2]) or by a trusted third party (belonging
to the trusted computation class in [2]). The for-
mer solutions require the meters can perform ad-
vanced computations like public key encryption or
homomorphic aggregation of encrypted data. Some
of them involve very relevant computation and/or
communication oveheads (See Section 2.1). The lat-
ter trusted party-based solutions do not impose any
extra requirement to meters.
– Obfuscation: energy usage curves are altered by in-
troducing controllable batteries and alternative gen-
eration devices within the household [22], or by the
addition of devices with an adjustable consumption
which inject noise to consumption traces [23]. This
approach does necessarily require advanced capabil-
ities on the smart meters, but involves the deploy-
ment of additional devices.
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The proposal we cryptoanalyze and fix in this paper
provides privacy by means of data aggregation using an
additive homomorphic cryptosystem. Next, we review
some previous proposals belonging to this class.
2.1 Aggregation-based proposals
Beyond the trivial approach of aggregating readings of
a group of n smart meters using a trusted third party
(see [11]), several works propose aggregation schemes
based on homomorphic encryption.
Garc´ıa and Jacobs [12] use a combination of ad-
ditive homomorphic encryption (Paillier cryptosystem)
and secret sharing. When transmitting a reading, each
meter Mi, i ∈ {1, . . . , n} splits its reading mi into n
shares mi1, . . . ,min and sends each share mij , i 6= j, en-
crypted under Mj ’s public key to the substation (SSt).
The SSt aggregates all the shares that are encrypted
under the same public key and sends each aggregate to
the corresponding meter Mj . Next, each Mj decrypts
the received aggregate, adds its own share mjj to it,
and finally sends the result back to SSt. The sum of the
decrypted aggregates, now available at the SSt, equals∑n
i=1mi. Clearly, the scheme has an elevated O(n
2)
communication cost per round.
A secret-sharing-based scheme proposed by Kur-
sawe et al. [13] gets along with lower communication
costs. In each round, p meters are deterministically cho-
sen as leaders. Each meter Mi generates p random num-
bers si1 , . . . , sip , one share for each leader, and sends
them—each encrypted with the respective leader’s pub-
lic key—to an aggregator (e.g., SSt), which forwards
them to the respective leaders. If a meter is a leader in
the current round, it aggregates the n− 1 shares it re-
ceived and chooses its own so that the overall addition
is 0. Each meter Mi masks its reading mi by adding to
it the sum of its shares before sending it to the aggrega-
tor. Due to the choice of the leaders’ shares, the sum of
all meters’ masked values computed by the aggregator
equals the sum of the unmasked readings. The cost per
round of this proposal is O(n ·p). For the proposal to be
secure, parameter p should be large enough so that the
probability of a simultaneous corruption of the chosen
p leaders is negligible. Hence, a secure setting (p ≈ n)
has a negative impact on the performance.
A´cs and Castelluccia [10] pursue a similar approach
for aggregation, but instead of choosing global lead-
ers, they deterministically select a number (`) of pairs
of smart meters in each round via a pseudo-random
function. Based on pairwise keys negotiated between
meters in a set-up phase, both meters of every pair
compute a shared, round-specific, dummy key which is
added by one and subtracted by the other meter to
prevent decryption of non-aggregated readings. Their
work is based on an encryption scheme which is ad-
ditively homomorphic on both the plaintext and the
key spaces [14]—a scheme which is also used in the ap-
proaches by Go´mez Ma´rmol et al. [15] and Vetter et
al. [16]. Note that the readings transmitted by a me-
ter could be determined if its ` chosen neighbours were
all corrupted. Hence, elevating the security level has a
negative impact on the system performance.
In [15], a group of smart meters are organized in
a ring with a periodically changing designated smart
meter acting as a key aggregator. Each meter chooses a
random key which is forwarded to the key aggregator.
The key aggregator aggregates all keys and provides the
result to the energy supplier, allowing it to decrypt the
homomorphically aggregated sum of encrypted readings
(with the respective keys) of all the meters of the group.
After each round, smart meters communicate with their
neighbors in the ring to perform key renewal in such a
way that the aggregated key is not changed. This so-
lution has a large complexity as the smart meters are
required to implement TLS connections, group signa-
tures and anonymous credentials.
In [16], smart meters derive round-specific keys from
a secret provided by a centralized trusted third party
(which, however, is not involved in regular communica-
tion) to encrypt their readings for storage in a database
operated by the energy supplier. From its knowledge
about the secrets of all the meters, the trusted third
party can provide aggregation keys to the energy sup-
plier that allow specific aggregation operations or other
database queries.
Erkin and Tsudik [17] present further approaches
based on additive homomorphic encryption and secret
sharing that mask readings in such a way that the read-
ings can be extracted after aggregation. The system
also allows both spatial and temporal aggregation of
individual encrypted readings.
Shi et al. [18] utilize random values which are as-
signed to smart meters by a trusted dealer. They are
chosen so that they sum up to zero to allow decryp-
tion only of aggregated readings. Li et al. [19] suggest
to build a spanning tree from a collector node to in-
dividual smart meters and aggregate readings at each
node of that tree using an additive homomorphic cryp-
tosystem under the collector node’s public key. In this
solution, a corrupted collector is able to get individual
consumptions by decrypting the messages generated by
the meters before their aggregation.
In Lu et al. [20], the Paillier cryptosystem is used
by a central entity which performs the aggregation.
The proposal by Ni et al. [21] distributes the n smart
meters in a ring arrangement, and two rounds of com-
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munication are performed to determine n polynomials
containing a random noise ri value each. The substa-
tion can then obtain the sum of all the noise values
r without requiring the collaboration of any trusted
third party. The readings mi are then encrypted using
a hash H of the current time slot t as ci = g
miH(t)ri
and aggregated as c =
∏n
i=1 ci. Schnorr signatures are
employed to ensure integrity. The substation can then
obtain V = cH(t)−r, and finally get the aggregated
readings from V after an easy instance of the discrete
logarithm problem.
Busom et al. [3] propose a distributed key-generation
method for an n-out-of-n threshold ElGamal. Energy
consumption readings are encrypted along with some
random noise which is removed during the decryption
of the aggregated consumption value. This proposal is
next explained in further detail in Section 3.
3 Busom et al. proposal
The protocol in [3] allows aggregation of the readings
of a group of smart meters without relying on a trusted
third party, except a certificate authority during the
setup process.
It is based on the additive version of the ElGamal
cryptosystem: a prime p is selected such that p = 2q+1,
with q also prime. Then an element g ∈ Z∗p of order q is
chosen and p, q and g are the public parameters of the
cryptosystem.
Given a public key y = gx (x ∈ Z∗q is the private
key), a message m ∈ Zq is encrypted as Ey(gm) =
(gr, gm · yr), r ∈R Z∗q . Decryption of such a cipher-
text provides gm as a result. A discrete logarithm is
required to retrieve the cleartext m, but since the pos-
sible range for m is known and not too large, it can be
done efficiently using Pollard’s lambda algorithm.
The proposal in [3] employs an n-out-of-n threshold
ElGamal. Each smart meter Mi stores a part xi of the
private key, and the corresponding certified public key
yi = g
xi . Using this scheme, no trusted third party is
needed to generate the group public key which is com-
puted as y =
∏
yi. An ElGamal ciphertext encrypted
under the group public key y can only be decrypted if
all the holders of a private key fragment do collaborate.
At a given round, a smart meter Mi takes its con-
sumption reading mi, generates at random ri, zi ∈R Z∗q ,
and sends
Ey(g
mi+zi) = (ci, di) = (g
ri , gmi+zi · yri)
to the substation, which will aggregate all the received
ciphertexts by computing
(c, d) = (
∏
ci,
∏
di).
Then, the substation sends c to each meter Mi, which
computes a partial decryption
Ti = c
xi · gzi .
Ti is returned to the substation, which decrypts
D = d · (
∏
Ti)
−1 = gm
with m =
∑
mi. Finally, the substation computes m =
loggD. A sketch of the protocol can be seen in Figure 1.
Smart meter Mi Substation SSt
Key establishment
Secret key: xi
Public key: yi = gxi
yi,Certi−−−−−−−−→
y =
∏n
i=1 yi
All yi,Certi←−−−−−−−−− if Certi is correct
Group public key: y
Step 1
Reading: mi
zi ∈R Z∗q
Ey(gmi+zi) = (ci, di)
(ci,di)−−−−−−−→ Step 2
(c, d) = (
∏
ci,
∏
di) =
(gr, gm+z ·yr),
with m =
∑n
i=1mi,
Step 3
c←−−−−−−− and z =∑ni=1 zi
Ti = cxi · gzi Ti−−−−−−−→ Step 4
D=d·(∏Ti)−1=gm,
m = loggD
Fig. 1: Sketch of the protocol described in [3]
The security analysis in [3] considers an attacker
model with a non trusted substation which may not
follow the protocol steps correctly with the goal of ob-
taining the individual reading mi of some targeted me-
ter Mi, maybe with the collaboration of other corrupted
smart meters. It is proven that after a proper protocol
execution, the substation can only obtain the addition
of (honest) meters’ readings. It is also shown that if
the substation sent back a value cˆ different from c for
partial decryption, it would not be able to obtain any
information about m =
∑
mi nor about any individual
reading mi.
However, as we will show next, these security state-
ments are only true if the protocol is run only once. If
the protocol is run for more than one round, as it is the
case in smart metering, a corrupted substation can be-
have improperly in a given round and obtain sensitive
information in subsequent rounds.
The system by Busom et al. [3], after fixing it, has
several advantages which, in our opinion, make it one
of the best proposals in the literature:
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– The communication cost per round is O(n) (n is
the number of meters in the neighborhood). More-
over, the individual consumption reading of a me-
ter can only be obtained after corrupting all the
other meters in the neighborhood. This aspect out-
performs [10,12,13], which have an O(n2) cost for
an equivalent security level.
– There does not exist a trusted party dealing or stor-
ing secret keys able to compromise meters privacy
if corrupted. That is the case for [16,18,19,20].
– Privacy on consumption readings is provided with-
out requiring any underlying secure protocol (like
TLS), i.e., an active attacker with full access to all
the communications between a substation and the
meters can only get the aggregated consumption. If
it was necessary to defend against an external at-
tacker aiming to alter the received data, then some
additional integrity mechanism like MACs should
be included.
Regarding the capacity of meters, the deployment of
such proposal would require Group 2 meters, according
to the classification given in [2].These are meters able
to perform moderate operations in terms of complex-
ity like data encryption/decryption under a public key
cryptosystem, and management of certificates and keys.
The solution proposed to fix the security flaw of [3] fur-
ther requires some additional memory for storing a list
of prime numbers (see Section 4.1).
3.1 Security flaw
We show how, in [3], a corrupted substation, without
requiring the collaboration of any corrupted smart me-
ter, can get the exact consumption reading of a targeted
smart meter at a given round of the protocol. As we will
see, the substation deviates from the protocol at a given
round in which it does not get any information about
the readings sent by the meters during that round. How-
ever, the information contained in that encrypted data
can be obtained by combining it with encrypted data
collected in future rounds. The security flaw and the
way a corrupted substation can get advantage from it
is described now.
The mentioned security flaw would permit, in a real
deployment, a corrupted substation to get all the indi-
vidual readings of any meter in its neighborhood. To
the best of our knowledge, this security flaw had not
been reported before.
At Step 2 of the protocol (see Figure 1), instead of
sending c to the meters, the substation generates and
sends a value cˆ computed as cˆ = gv for a randomly
chosen and known integer v. Each meter, upon receiving
cˆ, will perform Step 3 as usual, returning Tˆi as a result:
Tˆi = (cˆ)
xi · gzi = (gv)xi · gzi = yvi · gzi .
Since the public keys yi are known, the substation
can obtain the value gzi of any smart meter Mi at that
round by computing:
gzi = Tˆi(y
v
i )
−1.
Now, given the ElGamal ciphertext Ey(g
mi+zi) =
(ci, di) previously sent by meter Mi, the substation is
able to generate a ciphertext Ey(g
mi) as (ci, di ·(gzi)−1)
(see Figure 3a). That ciphertext will be denoted as
Ey(g
m′i). Note that this computation could be performed
simultaneously for all the meters. Nevertheless, we will
now assume that the substation is only interested in
the consumption reading of a targeted meter Mi. Let
us refer to the components of Ey(g
m′i) as (c′, d′) =
(gr
′
i , gm
′
i · yr′i).
At Step 2 of the next round, after properly aggre-
gating all the meter ciphertexts and obtaining (c, d) as
result, the substation can compute
(c′′, d′′) = (c · (c′)mmax , d · (d′)mmax),
with mmax being an upper bound on the sum of all me-
ters’ readings at any given round. Note that as (c, d) =
(gr, gm+z · yr), then (c′′, d′′) is an ElGamal ciphertext
for Ey(g
m+z+m′i·mmax) since
(c′′, d′′) = (c · (c′)mmax , d · (d′)mmax) =
= (gr · gr′i·mmax , gm+z · yr · gm′i·mmax · yr′i·mmax) =
= (gr+r
′
i·mmax , gm+z+m
′
i·mmax · yr+r′i·mmax) =
= (gr
′′
, gm+z+m
′
i·mmax · yr′′) = Ey(gm+z+m′i·mmax)
for r′′ = r + r′i ·mmax.
The substation can now send c′′ to all the meters,
and from the returned T ′′i values, it can get:
D′′ = d′′(
∏
T ′′i )
−1 = gm+m
′
i·mmax .
Finally, the discrete logarithm of D′′ at the base g
provides m+m′i ·mmax as a result which can easily be
decomposed into m and m′i since m < mmax. In this
way, the substation gets the individual reading m′i sent
by meter Mi at the previous round in addition to the
aggregated reading m of the current round.
Note that the time complexity to solve the discrete
logarithm would increase by a factor of
√
mmax approx-
imately. With n ≤ 128, the problem is about 1000 times
harder to solve. In our experiments, on a modern pro-
cessor, such computation took less than 20 seconds.
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4 Repaired proposal
In this section we propose a way to modify the protocol
in [3] so that, at the end of each round, the substation is
forced to provide a proof to the meters that it performed
the protocol correctly. In case of failure, the meters will
require a rekeying operation (Section 4.2).
The public ElGamal parameters are not modified:
a prime p such that p = 2q + 1, with q prime, and an
order-q element g ∈ Z∗p are chosen. Additionally, in a
neighborhood composed of n meters, an integer l ≥ 16
satisfying l·n ≤ blog2 pc−64 (so that 2l·n  p) is taken.
During the setup process, the substation precom-
putes and stores an array a = (a0, . . . , ammax) with
ai = (g
i)−1, for i ∈ {0, . . . ,mmax}.
At a given round, each meterMi generates a random
zi ∈R Z∗q and takes a random prime pi whose bitlength
is at most l and belongs to the subgroup of Z∗p generated
by g, and sends its consumption reading mi encrypted
under the group public key y as
Ey(pi · gmi+zi) = (ci, di) = (gri , pi · gmi+zi · yri)
to the SSt, which aggregates all the received ciphertexts
into (c, d) = (
∏
ci,
∏
di).
Steps 2 and 3 of the original proposal remain un-
modified. The SSt sends c to each meter and receives
all the Ti = c
xi · gzi per response. Then, it computes
D = d · (∏Ti)−1 = P · gm, with P = ∏ pi and m =∑
mi. Now the substation just needs to find the prob-
ably unique m such that D · am < 2l·n, obtaining then
the values m and P = D · am.
The substation factorizes P and stores its prime fac-
tors in an ordered list pv, which is then sent to all the
meters. Each meter Mi will then check that the prime
pi it chose is in pv and |pv| = n. If the check fails, the
meter requests an execution of a key renewal operation
(Section 4.2). This serves as an assurance that the sub-
station has performed the protocol correctly, as the list
pv of primes can not be obtained by other means.
Note that, as a result of a key renewal operation, the
current group public key y = gx is replaced with a new
one y¯ = gx¯, so that any ciphertext Ey(g
m′i) becomes
the encryption of an undetermined cleartext under the
new public key. This is so because
Ey(g
m′i) = (gr
′
i , gm
′
i ·yr′i) = (gr′i , gm′i ·gx·r′i ·g−x¯·r′i ·gx¯·r′i) =
= (gr
′
i , gm
′
i+r
′
i(x−x¯) · y¯r′i) = Ey¯(gm′i+r′i(x−x¯)),
being the difference between private keys (x− x¯) a ran-
dom value unknown to any party. Hence, after rekeying,
any ciphertext collected in previous rounds becomes the
encryption of a valueless random message.
The transmission of pv to all the meters was not
in the (weak) original proposal [3]. Since pv is storing
the prime factors of P , which is an element of Zp, its
bitlength is at most that of an element of Zp. Hence,
the communication overhead introduced is O(n) if the
transmission from the substation to the meters is uni-
cast, or O(1) if a broadcast channel is available. In any
case, the communication complexity of the proposal re-
mains the same, O(n).
Next, we provide a more detailed description of the
repaired proposal.
4.1 Setup
– System parameters: An ElGamal cryptosystem is
set up by choosing two large primes p and q, with
p = 2q + 1, and an order q element g ∈ Z∗p. An in-
teger l ≥ 16 satisfying l · n ≤ blog2 pc − 64 is also
chosen.
– Digital certificates: each meter Mi stores a certifi-
cate CertCAi with a private/public key pair whose
public key is certified by a trusted authority. Such
key pair will allow the meter to self-sign its public
keys.
– Prime table precomputation: each meter Mi stores
a table with all the prime integers whose bitlength
is at most l and belong to the subgroup of Z∗p gen-
erated by g.
– Array precomputation: The substation computes and
stores an array a = (a0, . . . , ammax) with
ai = (g
i)−1, for i ∈ {0, . . . ,mmax},
where mmax is an upper bound on the aggregated
consumption of all meters’ readings at a given round.
4.2 Key establishment
– Each meterMi takes a random xi ∈ Z∗q as its current
private key, and computes the corresponding public
key yi = g
xi . A certificate Certi is issued for yi using
the key pair in CertCAi. It then sends the key estab-
lishment data KEDi = (yi, Certi,CertCAi,PK(xi))
to the substation, with PK(xi) being a proof of
knowledge on secret key xi (a signed timestamp
would serve to that end).
– For each meter, the substation verifies the certificate
CertCAi under the public key of the certificate au-
thority, then it verifies Certi under the public key in
CertCAi, and it finally checks the proof of knowl-
edge on the private key related to the public key
yi. If all the checks are found correct it forwards all
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KEDi to all the meters, which will perform the same
checks.
– Finally, the substation and all the smart meters
compute the group public key:
y =
n∏
i=1
yi.
4.3 Electricity consumption transmission
Every time period (e.g., every 15 or 30 min) the SSt
sends a message to all the smart meters requesting their
electricity measurements. Let mi denote the reading of
smart meter Mi at the current time period.
1. Each Mi generates a random zi ∈R Z∗q and takes a
random prime pi < 2
l from its internal memory. It
then composes and sends, to the SSt, the ciphertext
Ey(pi · gmi+zi) = (ci, di) = (gri , pi · gmi+zi · yri).
2. The SSt aggregates all the received messages as
(c, d) = (
∏
ci,
∏
di) = (g
r, P · gm+z · yr),
with m =
∑
mi, z =
∑
zi and P =
∏
pi, and sends
c to each Mi.
3. Each Mi computes Ti = c
xi ·gzi and sends the result
to the SSt. At this point, each Mi removes zi from
its memory.
4. The SSt computes
D = d · (
∏
Ti)
−1 = P · gm.
Since P < 2l·n, the SSt determines the received m
as the probably only one satisfying
D · am < 2l·n.
Since D · am = P , the SSt can now factor P and
send its prime factors in an ordered list pv to each
Mi.
5. Each Mi checks that pi ∈ pv and |pv| = n. If some
meter’s check fails, it requests the execution of the
key establishment protocol (see Section 4.2) and all
the meters’ public keys and the group public key are
renewed.
In Figure 2 a sketch of the repaired protocol can be
seen, with P denoting the internal table storing prime
numbers.
Smart meter Mi Substation SSt
Key establishment
Secret key: xi
Public key: yi = gxi
KEDi−−−−−−→
y =
∏n
i=1 yi
All KEDi←−−−−−−−If all KEDi are correct
Group public key: y
Step 1
Reading: mi
zi∈R Z∗q , pi∈R P,
Ey(pi ·gmi+zi) = (ci, di) (ci,di)−−−−−−→ Step 2
(c, d)=(
∏
ci,
∏
di) =
(gr, P ·gm+z ·yr)
with m =
∑
mi,
Step 3
c←−−−−− z =∑ zi, and P = ∏ pi
Ti = cxi · gzi Ti−−−−−−→ Step 4
D=d ·(∏Ti)−1=P ·gm
Find m such that
D·am< 2l·n, P =D·am
Step 5
pv←−−−−−−−−Factorize P and store
Check pi∈ pv, |pv|=n its factors in a list pv
Otherwise, key renewal
Fig. 2: Sketch of the repaired protocol
5 Security analysis and parameter tuning
The repaired proposal inherits most of its security prop-
erties from the original proposal [3], like the impossi-
bility for a corrupted substation to get any information
about individual consumption readings after just one
round of the protocol. That is, after just one round,
a corrupted substation together with a subset of cor-
rupted smart meters, can not learn more than the sum
of the readings of the rest of honest meters.
However, as detailed in Section 3.1, if the original
protocol is executed more than one round, the individ-
ual readings of individual smart meters can be obtained.
Next, we provide a security analysis of our repaired pro-
posal.
In the repaired proposal, a meter Mi chooses a small
prime pi that is part of the ciphertext it transmits to
the substation. Since the small primes employed in the
repaired proposal belong to the subgroup of Zp gener-
ated by g, then it holds that pi = g
vi for some value vi.
Then, the ciphertext Ey(pi · gmi+zi) can be expressed
as Ey(g
vi · gmi+zi) which is equal to Ey(gm′i+zi) with
m′i = vi + mi. Hence, the ciphertexts transmitted in
the repaired proposal are of the same form as in the
original one.
Therefore, we can apply the Proposition 4 in [3],
which is next reproduced.
Proposition 1 Let us consider a neighborhood com-
posed of n meters so that a subset of them, M1, . . . ,Mn′ ,
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n′ ≤ n, acts honestly. Obtaining a partial aggregation
of their consumption values is as hard as solving a CDH
problem.
In our case, the mentioned proposition implies that
if an attacker has corrupted meters Mn′+1, . . . ,Mn, the
only information it can obtain about the honest ones
(M1, . . . ,Mn′) is g
∑n′
i=1m
′
i =
∏n′
i=1 pi · g
∑n′
i=1mi .
After a proper protocol execution, the substation
obtains
∏n
i=1 pi ·g
∑n
i=1mi and the previous partial mes-
sage can be computed if the corrupter meters tell their
pi and mi values. Hence, the protocol guarantees that,
after a protocol run, the attacker can not get any infor-
mation about the cleartexts but that given by a proper
execution.
In the repaired proposal, at the end of a protocol
round, the substation is required to prove the knowl-
edge of the prime numbers chosen by the meters. Oth-
erwise, a rekeying procedure will be run. From the pre-
vious analysis, a corrupted substation can only get the
primes pi after a proper protocol execution, otherwise,
it gets no information about them and the only remain-
ing option is to guess them at random. Figure 3b de-
picts how the attack described in Section 3.1 fails when
a targeted smart meter notices that its prime pi is not
in the received list.
Considering that each smart meter Mi chooses pi
independently of each other, and assuming that only a
subset of n′ < n meters are honest (so that the remain-
ing n − n′ primes are known to the substation), the
substation should return a list containing the n′ un-
known ones. The probability that such an n-elements
list contains the n′ unknown ones is
(
n
k
)n′
with k being
the amount of primes smaller than 2l that belong to the
subgroup of Zp generated by g. Note that k ≈ pi(2l)/2
with pi(x) being the prime-counting function. Since half
of the elements of Zp belong to the subgroup of g then,
approximately half of the primes smaller than 2l belong
to that subgroup.
The value for l should be set to avoid a too easy
guessing of such primes, so that we recommend l ≥ 16.
Also, l should satisfy 2l·n  p so that the probability
that there exist more than one am satisfying D · am <
2l·n is negligible and it is possible to detect the correct
P =
∏
pi from its length. To that end, we recommend
to take
l ≤ blog2 pc − 64
n
.
In this way, the probability that a random element in
Zp is smaller than 2l·n is less than 2−64. In a setting
with mmax = 2
20, the expected amount of protocol ex-
ecutions to be performed before the first failure would
be around 244. Assuming a transmission each 15 min-
utes, the expected time before the first failure would
be larger than 5 · 108 years. The only consequence of
such failure would be the execution of an unnecessary
rekeying operation.
If we take the smallest recommended value for l,
i.e. l = 16, we get k ≈ pi(216)/2 = 3271 (the exact
amount depends on the choice of p). All such primes
could be stored inside each meter as 16 bits integers,
requiring less than 7 KiB of memory, making it easy
for the meters to take any of them at random. In a
neighborhood composed of n = 128 meters, if n′ =
10 meters are honest, the probability to guess all their
primes is around 8.4 · 10−15, and even with n′ = 5, the
probability is still less than 9.2 · 10−8.
6 Experimental analysis
To verify the feasibility of our protocol in practice, we
performed experiments on a computer with an Intel
i5 4460 (3.4 GHz turbo frequency, 4 cores) processor,
using the GMP library (The GNU Multiple Precision
Arithmetic Library) and OpenMP in a C++ program.
The time to generate the array a with mmax = 2
20,
which is enough for up to 128 smart meters, using a
2048 bits prime p, was 20 seconds. This was stored in
a 260 MiB file. If we take a 3072 bits prime, we can
potentially accommodate up to 180 smart meters, and
the corresponding array a requires 550 MiB of storage.
The array was generated in 60 seconds.
The other time consuming task is that in Step 4,
in which the substation multiplies D by the elements
in array a until getting a result whose length in bits
is smaller than l ·n. As we can see in Figure 4, the
maximum time required to find am scales linearly with
the number of smart meters n, for a fixed prime p. The
size of l does not affect this time.
With l ≤ blog2 pc−64n , and by choosing p to be 2048
bits long, a neighborhood can include up to 124 smart
meters. If more meters are to be accommodated, a larger
p must be chosen.
By looking at Figure 4 we conclude that a reason-
able value for p is a 2048 bit prime. This setting pro-
vides a high enough security while keeping the comput-
ing time at around half a second. For more meters, it
could be advisable to split the community into several
groups rather than increasing p.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we describe a vulnerability found in a
homomorphic aggregation-based proposal [3] for report-
ing the consumption of a group of smart meters. The
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Smart meter Mi Substation SSt
Step 1
Reading: mi
zi ∈R Z∗q
Ey(gmi+zi) = (ci, di)
(ci,di)−−−−−−−→ v ∈R Z∗q
Step 3
cˆ←−−−−−−− cˆ = gv
Tˆi = cˆxi · gzi Tˆi−−−−−−−→ gzi = Tˆi(yvi )−1
Ey(gmi) = (ci, di(gzi)−1)
(a) First round of a successful attack on the original protocol
Smart meter Mi Substation SSt
Step 1
Reading: mi
zi ∈R Z∗q , pi∈R P
Ey(pi · gmi+zi) =
= (ci, di)
(ci,di)−−−−−−−→ v ∈R Z∗q
Step 3
cˆ←−−−−−−− cˆ = gv
Tˆi = cˆxi · gzi Tˆi−−−−−−−→ gzi = Tˆi(yvi )−1
Ey(pigmi) = (ci, di(gzi)−1)
Step 5
Random pv←−−−−−−−− No info on pi
pi /∈ pv
Key renewal
(b) Failed attack against the repaired protocol
Fig. 3: First round of an attack against the original (left) and the repaired (right) proposals
Fig. 4: Maximum time to perform Step 4 and find m
and P depending on the number of meters n and the
size in bits of p.
security flaw allowed a corrupted substation to obtain
individual readings of meters.
After that, we propose a way to slightly modify the
original proposal so as to fix the mentioned security
flaw. The modified proposal is very similar to the orig-
inal one. It adds an additional transmission at the end
of each round in which the substation proves that it
has followed the protocol properly. The repaired pro-
posal is proven to maintain the privacy of smart meters
throughout several execution rounds.
The computations carried out by the meters are ba-
sically the same than in the original proposal, but now
they have to choose a small random prime, which can
be taken from a small precomputed table. The substa-
tion has a higher computation overhead, specially dur-
ing the setup in which it has to precompute and store
a relatively large array. Nevertheless, that computation
is performed only once at setup time.
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